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"DETAILS ARE OF A MOST REVOLTING CHARACTER":
CRUELTY TO SLAVES AS SEEN IN APPEALS TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA*
JUDITH K. SCHAFER**
When Louisiana became an American possession in 1803, the terri-
tory's approximately 38,000 slaves had rights unknown in any state of
the American South. Most important of these were the right of self-
purchase and the right to petition to be sold away from a cruel master.
American rule instituted an era of diminished protections for slaves as
Louisiana planters found themselves for the first time in a position to
make their own laws.' In 1806, the territorial legislature passed a new
Black Code which greatly reduced the rights of slaves in American Loui-
siana.2 They lost the right of self-purchase, unless their owner volunta-
rily permitted it. Furthermore, the new code mandated that juries had to
criminally convict slaveholders of cruelty before they could be forced to
* This Article is part of a larger manuscript, Slavery, the Civil Law, and the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, which will be published by Louisiana State University Press (forthcoming 1994). The
author is grateful for permission granted by the press to publish this Article. Both this Piece and the
book-length study are based on the manuscript records of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which
are housed in Account No. 106 in the Earl K. Long Library of the University of New Orleans.
Although scholars have had access to the printed reports of the decisions of the court, the original
handwritten decisions have only recently become available. This is the first book-length study of
these incredibly rich and valuable records. The printed reports usually contain a brief and often
sparse recitation of the facts of the case, the decision of the court, and the legal reasoning on which
the court based the decision. The case files ordinarily include a handwritten copy of the lower court
case, including attorneys' arguments, depositions, written interrogatories, and the clerk's summary
of the testimony. Thus the handwritten case record ordinarily contained fifty to one hundred pages,
and included a wealth of detail only suggested by the brief printed report of the case. Before these
records became available, students of slave law had only legal indexes, such as the LOUISIANA
DIGEST: 1809 TO DATE (1959) and HELEN T. CATrERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING
AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO (1926), to guide them to judicial decisions involving slavery.
The index in the Louisiana Digest is based on the reports of cases and is far from complete, and
Catterall was forced to base her work on the reported cases, as she did not have access to the original
manuscripts of the court. Furthermore, there are a number of appeals involving slavery which were
never reported, and are therefore only available in manuscript form. These unreported cases are
invisible in Catterall's work and in all legal indexes. For the convenience of those readers who may
wish to access the manuscript records previously mentioned, we have included the docket number
where applicable in the case citations.
** Associate Director, Murphy Institute of Political Economy and Visiting Associate Profes-
sor, Tulane Law School. The author wishes to thank the Director of the Murphy Institute, Richard
F. Teichgraeber III, for his support and encouragement.
1. Hans Baade, The Law of Slavery in Spanish Luisiana, 1769-1803, in LOUISIANA'S LEGAL
HERITAGE 74-75 (Edward F. Haas, Jr. ed., 1983).
2. Act of June 7, 1806, ORLEANS TERRITORY ACrS, 1806, at 150-90 (act prescribing the rules
and conduct to be observed with respect to negroes and other slaves of the territory) [hereinafter
referred to as the Black Code, to distinguish it from the French Code Noir].
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sell an allegedly abused slave. Slaves had not only lost the right to peti-
tion the courts for sale away from an abusive master, but the right to
initiate any legal action, except for suing for their freedom. 3
One of the primary purposes of the Black Code was to create a legal
apparatus for the control and discipline of slaves. Slavery, by its very
nature, required such regulation. Discipline was an essential element of
the slave system if slaves were to earn a profit for their masters as well as
pay for their own maintenance. Control of slave behavior also main-
tained the image of white superiority and the prescribed and delicate eti-
quette of relations between the races. In addition, whites believed that
making slaves "stand in fear"4 was a necessary precaution to prevent
slave insurrections as well as to maintain discipline.
Breaches of discipline necessitated punishment which was most
often physical in nature, and although all such punishments were inher-
ently cruel, if the chastiser were a martinet, excessive--even barbarous-
cruelty was always possible. The Black Code prohibited cruel treatment
beyond that which was acceptable in American Louisiana, but recalci-
trant slaves and hot-tempered masters were a combination that could
convert control into extraordinary cruelty and violence. According to
the Black Code, slaves were "passive" creatures, whose subordination to
their master and "to all who represent him" was "not susceptible of any
modification." 5 Hence, even minor insubordination might have been an
occasion for excessive punishment. The Digest of 1808, a compilation of
the civil law in territorial Louisiana, reinforced the Black Code: "The
slave is entirely subject to the will of his master who may correct him and
chastise him, though not with unusual rigor, nor so as to maim or muti-
late him, or expose him to the danger of loss of life, or to cause his
death."' 6 The Digest of 1808 also provided for the court-ordered sale of
slaves whose owners had been convicted of cruel treatment if the presid-
ing judge so ordered.7 No other American state had such a provision. 8
3. Black Code, Crimes and Offenses § 16, supra note 2, at 206-07. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana refused to allow a free black woman to sue for cruelty on behalf of her slave daughter.
Dorothie v. Coquillon, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 350 (La. 1829).
4. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH 146 (1956).
5. Black Code, Crimes and Offenses § 16, supra note 2, at 206-07.
6. MOREAU LISLET, A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF
ORLEANS, 1808, tit. VI, art. 16, at 40 (reprint ed. 1971) (1808) [hereinafter DIGEST OF 1808]. Along
with acts of the Louisiana legislature, the Digest of 1808 served as law in Louisiana until replaced by
the CIVIL CODE OF 1825 (New Orleans, 1825) [hereinafter CIVIL CODE].
7. DIGEST OF 1808, tit. IV, art. 27, at 42.
8. WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 149
(London, Clarke, Beeton & Co. 1853). Goodell points out that masters had only to repeat excessive
punishments until they became "usual."
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The Black Code also prohibited the maiming or killing of slaves by
their owners or others. Persons who treated slaves with cruelty risked a
fine of between $200 and $500. 9 The Code excepted certain types of
physical chastisement from its definition of cruel punishment: "flogging,
or striking with a whip, leather thong, switch or small stick."10 Other
exceptions included placing a slave in fetters and confinement of the
slave. It is indicative of legislative sentiment concerning cruelty to
slaves that Louisiana lawmakers passed an act in 1821 that mandated a
fine of $200 or imprisonment for six months for a person convicted of
"wantonly or maliciously kill[ing] any horse, mare, gelding, mule, or
jack-ass."' 2 Those convicted of this crime were also liable to the owner
of the animal for its value.' 3 Persons convicted of having "cruelly beat,
maim[ed], or disable[ed]" animals were subject to a $100 fine and were
liable for damages to the animal.
14
Evidence that excessive violence and cruel treatment of slaves was
not an uncommon event in Louisiana abounds in plantation diaries and
other manuscript sources. The most famous case involved the notorious
Madame Lalaurie. A New Orleans court found this sadistic woman
guilty of abusing her slaves and ordered the sale of the slaves away from
their mistress.15 Lalaurie's relatives purchased the slaves and returned
them to her. She chained them to the walls of her Royal Street home,
where she reportedly alternated between torturing and striking them. On
April 10, 1834, an elderly slave, fettered to a garret, somehow managed
to set fire to Lalaurie's house. The New Orleans Bee described the events
that followed:
The conflagration at the house occupied by the woman Lalaurie
... has been the means of discovering one of those atrocities, the de-
tails of which seem to be too incredible for human belief. We would
shrink from the task of detailing the painful circumstances connected
therewith, were it not that a sense of duty.., renders it indispensable
to do so.
The flames having spread with alarming rapidity, and the horrible
suspicion being entertained among the spectators, that some of the in-
mates of the premises . . . were incarcerated therein. Upon entering
one of the apartments, the most appalling spectacle met their eyes.
Seven slaves more or less horribly mutilated, were seen suspended by
the neck, with their limbs apparently stretched and torn from one ex-
9. Black Code, Crimes and Offenses § 16, supra note 2, at 208.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Act of January 31, 1821, 1821 La. Acts 24 (concerning crimes and misdemeanors).
13. Id. § 1.
14. Id. § 2.
15. NEW ORLEANS BEE, April 11-12, 1834.
1993]
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tremity to the other. The slaves were the property of the demon, in the
shape of a woman. They had been confined by her for several months
... and had been merely kept in existence to prolong their sufferings
and make them taste all that the most refined cruelty could inflict.16
Those who came to fight the fire turned into an angry mob when they
observed the pitiful condition of her slaves. Madame Lalaurie barely es-
caped the city just ahead of a furious band of onlookers. The angry
crowd destroyed her furniture by dropping it from the balcony to the
courtyard below, and then proceeded to demolish most of the house. 17
Section 16 of the Black Code authorized criminal prosecution for
mutilation, severe ill-treatment, or the killing of a slave.' Section 17
provided that if a slave were "mutilated, beaten or ill-treated" when no
witnesses were present, the owner or person responsible for managing the
slave would be prosecuted for cruelty, unless he or she could produce
evidence to the contrary.' 9 Since slaves could not testify in court against
whites, this provision was intended to protect slaves in situations in
which they were the only witnesses to the cruel treatment. However, the
creators of the Black Code left a loophole in the article concerning cruel
treatment: an owner prosecuted under such circumstances could also
clear himself "by his own oath."' 20 Although this provision weakened the
law prohibiting cruelty to slaves, and although few slave owners were
ever prosecuted for cruelty to their slaves, neither Louisiana law nor the
state's courts ever ruled out this possibility as did North Carolina Judge
Thomas Ruffin, writing for the court, in State v. Mann.21 In this often
quoted decision, the court held that slave owners could not be held crimi-
nally responsible for an assault and battery on one of their own slaves,
because such a ruling contradicted the absolute power of the slaveholder
which was necessary "to render the submission of the slave perfect."' 22
Plenty of evidence of ill-treatment exists in the records of appeals of
civil cases to the court. At times the cases reveal unprovoked or senseless
violence on the part of owners, overseers, or strangers. In many in-
16. Id.
17. STAMPP, supra note 4, at 182, 188; JOE G. TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN LOUISIANA 225-
27 (1963). Fred Darkis contends that Mme. Lalaurie was the victim of a "bad press." Fred R.
Darkis, Madame Lalaurie of New Orleans, 23 LA. HIsT. 383 (1982).
18. Black Code, Crimes and Offenses §§ 16, 17, supra note 2, at 206-08.
19. Id. § 17, supra note 2, at 208.
20. Id. South Carolina was the only other state with the provision that slaveholders could clear
themselves from a charge of cruelty to their slaves by a personal oath. GOODELL, supra note 8, at
280.
21. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
22. Id. at 266. See also, State v. Raines, 14 S.C.L. 314, 3 McCord 538 (1826). For an overview
of prosecutions for cruelty to slaves in common law states see Andrew Fede, Legitimized Violent
Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619-1865: A Case Study of Law and Social Change in Six
Southern States, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 93-150 (1985).
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stances, cruelty to a slave resulted from a white's overreaction to a slave's
minor infraction.
Three factors prevented the Supreme Court of Louisiana from hear-
ing many appeals from criminal trials for cruelty to a slave during the
antebellum period. The most obvious is that there were few prosecutions
of this nature. Since slaves were often the only witnesses to such inci-
dents, and since Louisiana law prohibited them from testifying against
whites, finding legally competent witnesses was difficult. Often white
witnesses, many of whom felt that slave discipline was a private matter
between slaveholders and their property, were reluctant to testify in pros-
ecutions for cruelty. Furthermore, as we will see in one instance, white
juries simply refused to convict, despite overwhelming evidence of brutal-
ity. In such cases, prosecutions of slave owners that ended in acquittal
were not appealed, and therefore do not appear in the records of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana. The third reason for the scarcity of crimi-
nal appeals is technical. The first constitution of the State of Louisiana
(1812) limited the jurisdiction of the state supreme court to civil ap-
peals.2 3 Until the Constitution of 1845 gave the high court criminal ju-
risdiction,24 the court heard no criminal appeals. Appeals of criminal
prosecutions for cruelty to slaves were therefore limited to the sixteen-
year period from 1846-1862, although the court heard appeals of civil
suits that involved death or injury to slaves throughout the antebellum
period.25 The court was quite willing to sustain the property rights of
slave owners in civil suits when their slaves were injured or killed by
others, but the justices had little opportunity to affirm convictions of
whites in criminal prosecutions. There were only six criminal appeals of
cruelty convictions to the court from 1846-1862. Each involved a slave
man who died from the abuse he received.
I. CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS FOR CRUELTY
The first appeal of a criminal conviction for cruelty to a slave oc-
curred in State v. Morris.26 The defendant allegedly beat his slave to
death "in a cruel and barbarous manner. . . causing sundry dangerous
and severe bruises and wounds upon the thigh, loins, and other parts of
the body. A hole in the abdomen, the size of a dollar which appeared to
23. CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA art. IV, § 2, at 503 (Benjamin W. Dart ed.,
1932).
24. Id. tit. IV, art. 63, at 514.
25. Id.
26. 4 La. Ann. 177 (1849).
1993]
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have been gouged out," was the immediate cause of death. 27 No one
witnessed this treatment of the slave. Morris presented his oath in an
affidavit denying his responsibility for the alleged cruelty. The district
judge instructed the jury that the oath was not conclusive evidence of the
defendant's innocence, and the jury found him guilty. Morris appealed,
claiming that under section 17 of the Black Code the owner's oath could
not only repeal the presumption of guilt created by the section, but was
intended to be conclusive proof of innocence. 28 Justice George King,
writing for the court, denied this interpretation of section 17:
... Such does not appear to us to be a just interpretation of the act.
The law creates a presumption of the master's guilt, which, in the ab-
sence of this express legislation, would not arise. It is founded upon
the relation of master and slave, and the power of the former to mal-
treat the latter secretly and without the possibility, in many instances,
of otherwise establishing his guilt.
He is consequently held answerable for the cruel treatment re-
ceived by his slave while under his charge, and when no person is pres-
ent, and is presumed to be guilty of the offence, "unless," in the words
of the act, "he can prove the contrary."
29
It has been correctly urged by the Attorney General, that the in-
terpretation contended for by the defendant would enable the master
to escape punishment by interposing his oath, when his guilt could be
satisfactorily established by other testimony which could not have been
contemplated by the legislature .... [I]n such cases the legislature
could not have intended that the owner should escape punishment by
interposing his own oath; or that the jury should acquit, notwithstand-
ing their convictions, from the testimony, of the guilt of the accused.
30
State v. Morris is one of only a handful of cases in the appellate court
records of the American South in which a state supreme court upheld the
conviction of a slaveholder for cruelty to his own slave. Overseers, poor
whites, and free persons of color were more likely to be successfully pros-
ecuted for abuse of slaves than slave owners.
31
Seven years elapsed before the court heard the next appeal of a con-
viction for cruelty, State v. Bass.32 The trial court convicted William
Bass and his stepfather, Harry McNabb, both described as yeomen, of
killing a slave named Joe, allegedly a runaway. According to the trial
court record, Bass shot Joe out of a tree with a shotgun loaded with
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Black Code, Crimes and Offenses § 17, supra note 2, at 208.
30. Morris, 4 La. Ann. at 177-78.
31. Fede, supra note 22, at 96, 133. For cases in other states involving convictions of masters
see State v. Hoover, 20 N.C. 413, 4 Dev. & Bat. 365 (1839); Souther v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7
Gratt.) 673 (1851).
32. State v. Bass, 11 La. Ann. 478 (1856).
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"divers leaden bullets." The slave had climbed the tree in order to escape
pursuing hounds. Bass's primary defense was that "he was but a boy"
and also an orphan. The prosecutor charged McNabb with aiding and
abetting Bass in the shooting. The jury acquitted McNabb, but found
Bass guilty with a recommendation of clemency, as Bass was an "orphan
boy of tender age." The Morehouse District Court judge sentenced Bass
to only thirty days in jail and a fine of $300. The State appealed to the
supreme court on the basis that the district court judge had erred in giv-
ing Bass such a light sentence because the judge had allowed Bass's coun-
sel to inappropriately introduce damaging testimony about the character
of the victim in an attempt to justify the shooting. However, Justice
Henry Spofford, writing for the court, upheld the decision of the trial
court. 33
Two of the other four criminal prosecutions for killing a slave in-
volved free blacks. In State v. Taylor,34 the First District Court of New
Orleans found the free black Joseph Jerry Taylor guilty of manslaughter
in the death of Henry Cruize, a slave. Taylor had killed Cruize by
throwing a brick at his head. The judge sentenced Taylor to seven years
at hard labor. The primary witness at the trial had been a mulatto
named Charles Robinson, who said he had been a slave, but his mistress
had freed him upon her death. Attorneys for Taylor objected to his testi-
mony, saying that Robinson had offered no proof that he was free, and if
he were a slave, he could not testify. Justice Spofford rejected this argu-
ment, stating that the objection to Robinson's testimony came only after
the testimony, too late to sustain such an objection. 35 The court affirmed
the judgment of the lower court.36
The other criminal appeal involving a free black, State v. Populus,
fi.c.,37 occurred the following year. The Rapides Parish District Court
convicted Joseph Populus of killing the slave David by stabbing him with
a dirk knife. The convicting jury recommended him to the mercy of the
court, and the judge sentenced him to twelve months at hard labor. His
attorneys appealed on the grounds that the judge had not sequestered the
jury after he had charged it. The jurors had gone home for the night and
had returned the next morning to render their verdict. The supreme
court found this irregularity sufficient grounds to grant the petition for a
33. Id.
34. 11 La. Ann. 430 (1856).
35. Id. at 431.
36. Id.
37. 12 La. Ann. 710 (1857).
1993)
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new trial. 38 No record of the subsequent proceeding exists.
In 1858, during its next term, the court heard an appeal from two
defendants in the second criminal conviction for cruelty to a slave by the
owner(s), State v. White & Ward.39 The St. Martin Parish jury found
George White and Clarence Ward guilty of "inflicting inhuman and
cruel treatment" on a slave under sections 16 and 17 of the Black Code,40
and the judge fined each $400. The slave had died from his wounds.
White appealed the conviction on a legal technicality, asserting that an
1855 legislative act relative to crimes repealed sections 16 and 17 of the
Black Code. White also asserted that if not repealed, sections 16 and 17
did not require a criminal prosecution for cruelty. He claimed that he
was entitled to a civil trial for damages rather than a criminal prosecu-
tion. The supreme court's opinion, written by Chief Justice Edwin Mer-
rick, rejected these arguments and upheld the conviction. Finding that
the act of 1855 did not repeal sections 16 and 17 of the Black Code, the
court's opinion was strongly in favor of criminal prosecution:
We know no law which requires the prosecution under these sections
of the Act of 1806 to be conducted as a civil suit. On the contrary, we
think that the terms, conviction and offence, used in them, imply a
prosecution by information or indictment. Moreover, the first offence
specified in section 16, viz, the offence of killing the slave of another,
could be prosecuted in no other manner.41
The last criminal prosecution for killing a slave, State v. Davis,42
occurred in 1859. The record of the lower court no longer exists. The
opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court indicates that a grand jury in-
dicted W. H. Davis, a white man, for felonious assault on a slave "by
willfully shooting at him with a shotgun loaded with gunpowder and di-
vers leaden shot."'43 Davis's attorneys filed a motion to quash the indict-
ment on grounds that no law allegedly existed that forbade a free person
from purposefully shooting at a slave with intent to kill. The Morehouse
Parish District Court ordered Davis's indictment to be quashed, but the
supreme court reversed this order, reinstated the indictment, and re-
manded the case to the lower court for prosecution. Associate Justice
James Cole wrote for the court: "Slaves are treated in our law as prop-
erty, and, also as persons; this section [of the Act of 1855 pertaining to
crimes] then applies to an assault upon a slave or upon a free person." 44
38. Id.
39. 13 La. Ann. 573 (1858).
40. Black Code, Crimes and Offenses §§ 16, 17, supra note 2, at 206-08.
41. White, 13 La. Ann. at 573.
42. 14 La. Ann. 678 (1859).
43. Id.
44. Id. See Act of March 14, 1855, § 9, 1855 La. Acts 131 (concerning crimes and offenses).
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II. CIVIL SUITS INVOLVING CRUELTY
Owners of slaves abused by others often chose to bring a civil action
for the value of the slave if the slave had died as a result of the abuse, or
for the amount the injury had diminished the slave's value. It is in these
cases that evidence of cruel treatment most often appears, but clearly the
property value of the slave took precedence to obtaining a just punish-
ment for the perpetrator of the barbarous treatment. Even a purely civil
matter would have brought the incident to the attention of the public
prosecutor, who could have chosen to begin a criminal prosecution. The
scarcity of criminal prosecutions was the result of solidarity among
whites and especially among slave owners, which often prevented whites
who witnessed the atrocities, or who had seen the physical evidence of
excessive violence, from pressing charges or even reporting slave abuse to
the authorities. Although slaves were often the sole witnesses to cruelty
to their fellow bondsmen, the Black Code disqualified slaves from testify-
ing in court against whites or free blacks.45
Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana in civil cases involving
cruel treatment or senseless, unprovoked violence against slaves can be
divided into three categories: cruel treatment of slaves by strangers, by
overseers, and by their masters. The last classification, that of abuse by
masters, was the least frequent, no doubt because slaves, disqualified
from testifying in court, were often the only witnesses to such incidents,
and masters would be unlikely to report the event themselves. On the
other hand, masters were much more likely to report acts of violence by
others that injured or killed their valuable slave property.
Slaves who stole animals and produce often risked serious gunshot
wounds and even death, though their infractions might have been minor.
In Allain v. Young,46 the Louisiana Supreme Court heard an appeal from
a free black slave owner named Frangois Allain, whose slave R~gese had
such a bad character, so witnesses testified, that no one would accept him
as a gift. R~gese regularly stole cattle and hogs from neighboring farms,
slaughtered them, and sold the meat. From the record it is not clear
whether Rigese acted without his master's knowledge, or whether Allain
profited from the sale of the stolen meat. When a man named Young
The judge in State v. Hale, a North Carolina case, ruled that assault on a slave by persons other than
the slave owner was an indictable offense. State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582 (1823).
45. Black Code, Crimes and Offenses § 16, supra note 2, at 206-08. Fede suggests that slave
owners chose civil remedies if the offender had the financial means to compensate for the damages to
or loss of the slave, but chose criminal prosecution to serve as a deterrent to poor whites who would
have been unable to come up with a sufficient amount to justify a civil suit for the value of the slave.
Fede, supra note 22, at 113.
46. 9 Mart. 221 (La. 1821).
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caught R6gese with some stolen animals, R6gese attempted to seize
Young's gun, and Young shot and killed him. Allain sued Young for
R6gese's value, which he estimated at $2,000. The judge of the lower
court held for the defendant, reasoning that R6gese died while commit-
ting a felony. Allain appealed, but the supreme court, in a decision writ-
ten by Chief Judge George Mathews, affirmed the lower court: "If a
slave of a bad character is pursued on suspicion of felony, attempts to
seize a gun, flies, and is killed in the pursuit, the supreme court will not
disturb a verdict for the defendant, who killed him."'47
R6gese had been involved in an extensive scheme to steal from
others. In most other cases involving animal stealing, thieves were com-
mitting petty larceny, usually pilfering chickens for their own use. The
court did not condone excessive violence in these instances. Dislonde,
fim.c. v. LeBrdret48 involved a free man of color who sued Pierre
LeBr6ret for shooting and killing his slave Isaac for attempting to steal
one of LeBr6ret's chickens. LeBr6ret caught the slave in the act, bound
him with a rope, and shot him, execution-style. LeBr6ret claimed the act
was justified, saying that Isaac was "in the habit of stealing and carrying
away the defendant's property in the night."'49 The supreme court re-
manded the case to the lower court to ascertain the value of Isaac, pre-
sumably to award damages to D6slonde. 50 There is no record of
subsequent action by the lower court.
In the 1850s, the Supreme Court of Louisiana heard several appeals
in which owners sued others for shooting their slaves for stealing animals
or produce. Stealing sugarcane resulted in the death of a slave and the
lawsuit, Carmouche v. Bouis.51 Narcisse Carmouche brought a civil ac-
tion against his neighbors, Francis P. Bouis and his son Louis, for the
value of a slave named John. Testimony indicated that a gang of slaves
had been making nightly raids on Bouis's sugar plantation to steal cane.
Determined to put an end to the nocturnal depredations, Bouis ordered
his son and his overseer to arm themselves and keep watch over his fields.
Both were instructed not to fire upon trespassing slaves, but merely to
fire warning shots to frighten them. When Bouis's son saw John climbing
the sugarcane field's fence, he fired without taking aim, and by chance,
mortally wounded the slave. The Pointe Coup6e Parish Court awarded
47. Id. For a similar case see H6bert v. Esnard, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 498 (La. 1830). It was against
the law for slaves to sell or barter produce without permission from their masters. Black Code § 14,
supra note 2, at 156-58.
48. 5 La. 96 (1833).
49. Id.
50. Id. For a similar case, see Richardson v. Dukes, 15 S.C.L., 4 McCord 156 (1827).
51. 6 La. Ann. 95 (1851).
(Vol. 68:1283
DETAILS ARE OF A REVOLTING CHARACTER
Carmouche $800. In his appeal, Bouis contended that he had the right
to defend his property. However, the supreme court justices ruled that
he was liable for the slave's death and resulting property loss to Car-
mouche. 52 The difference between this case and the decision in Allain v.
Young 53 lay in the nature of the slaves' acts: R6gese's attempt to seize a
firearm was a felony; in Carmouche, John's offense was petty theft. Jus-
tice Isaac Preston, writing for the court, held that homicide was not nec-
essary to prevent a misdemeanor, and that the killing of John was
unnecessary for the defense of Bouis's person, family, or property.
54
Eight years later, the court heard an appeal from the District Court
of Plaquemines Parish, McCutcheon v. Angelo,55 which involved the
shooting and blinding of a slave named John Hall, the property of S. D.
McCutcheon. The plaintiff brought a civil action for $3000, $2000 of
which was the alleged value of the slave and $1000 for his future mainte-
nance, as McCutcheon claimed the slave was worthless as a result of his
injuries. Angelo claimed that he shot the slave because he had observed
him lurking about his chicken house. When the slave realized that An-
gelo had seen him, he fled, ignoring Angelo's order to stop, whereupon
Angelo shot him. The attending physician testified that Hall had been
wounded eight times, including one shot in one eye and two in the other.
The lower court judge awarded McCutcheon $1,500, stating that Angelo
had used excessive force for petty larceny. In his appeal, Angelo asserted
that his actions were justified as the slave was in the act of committing a
felony, and that he had refused to obey Angelo's order to halt. The
supreme court ordered Angelo to pay the damages assessed by the lower
court. Chief Justice Edwin Merrick wrote the opinion dismissing the de-
fendant's assertion that chicken stealing was a felony and rejecting An-
gelo's contention that the shooting was justified by the slave's refusal to
stop when commanded:
[I]t is true that it is provided by law that "if any slave shall be found
absent from his usual place of working or residence, without some
white person accompanying him, and shall refuse to submit himself to
examination, any freeholder shall be permitted to seize and correct
him; and if he should resist or attempt to escape, the freeholder is au-
thorized to make use of arms, but to avoid killing the slave; but should
the slave assault and strike him, he is authorized to kill him."
' 56
52. Id.
53. 9 Mart. 221 (La. 1821).
54. Carmouche, 6 La. Ann. at 95. For an almost identical case involving a slave shot in the act
of stealing a hog, see Bibb v. Hebert, 3 La. Ann. 132 (1848). See also Jennings v. Fundeburg, 15
S.C.L. 96, 4 McCord 161 (1827).
55. 14 La. Ann. 34 (1859).
56. Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Justice Merrick's opinion made no mention of an 1818 case,
Jourdan v. Patton,57 in which the court ordered an owner fully compen-
sated for the blinding of her slave to transfer title to the owner of the
slave who caused the injury. That the supreme court considered the
well-being of the slave, who had been owned by the same mistress for
many years, but denied that the slave's future situation had relevance
under the law. The difference was that in Jourdan the slave was injured
by another slave, while in McCutcheon the slave was gravely wounded by
the very person to whom title would have transferred. Although in
Jourdan the court stated that "[c]ruelty and inhumanity ought not to be
presumed against any person,"58 Angelo's excessive punishment for
chicken stealing went far beyond the presumption that further abuse of
the slave might occur.59
During the same term that the court decided McCutcheon, it also
heard the appeal of Gardiner v. Thibodeau,60 a civil suit in which Ed-
ward C. Gardiner sought to recover the value of his slave Charles. The
slave had been in the act of stealing chickens when Jean Thibodeau shot
and killed him. A witness stated that after the shooting "[t]here were
chicken feathers from the [chicken] yard to the place where the negro
was lying."' 61 Thibodeau admitted that he had shot Charles because he
ordered the slave to halt, and the slave continued to flee. The District
Court of St. Landry Parish found for the defendant. Citing an 1857 act,
which provided that "[i]t shall be lawful to fire upon runaway negroes,
who may be armed, when pursued, if they refused to surrender,
'62
Thibodeau contended that he was justified in shooting Charles because
he was running away and was armed. Chief Justice Merrick, writing for
the court, rejected this argument:
It is proved that a knife was found in the pocket of his coat after the
body of the negro was removed to the residence of the plaintiff. The
coat was lying at the feet of the boy, and the knife was a butcher knife,
six or seven inches long. This does not bring the case within the stat-
ute. The defendant did not pretend (as we have seen), that he killed
57. 5 Mart. 615 (La. 1818).
58. Id. at 617.
59. Mark Tushnet discusses Jourdan v. Patton in his book THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY:
CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981). Tushnet states that in Jourdan, the
Supreme Court recognized the "sentiment that slavery could generate between master and slave,"
but denied that those ties were relevant because there was no reason to presume that the owner of the
slave who blinded the plaintiff's slave would be cruel. Id. at 66-71. But this analysis does not take
into account the possibility that if the "sentiment" between the mistress and her slave was so strong,
she could have accepted less than the full value of her slave, and title would not have transferred.
60. 14 La. Ann. 732 (1859).
61. Id. at 733.
62. Act of March 19, 1857, § 41, 1857 La. Acts 233.
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the slave because he was a runaway and armed, but because he
was stealing his chickens, and run [sic], and did not stop when
commanded.
If it be assumed, that the negro had his coat on when he was
stealing the chickens, and the knife was in the pocket, the defence still
fails, because it is now shown that the slave was a runaway. So far from
being a runaway, the proof makes it sufficiently certain that he was out
for no other purpose than that of stealing chickens; two of which were
found by his house. The proof shows, that he was addicted to theft;
but there is none tending to show that he was a runaway. Our law
does not justify the killing of any one for a theft, and the defendant is
left without sufficient justification. 63
The supreme court reversed the decision and awarded Gardiner
$1,150. Citing McCutcheon v. Angelo,64 the court ordered Thibodeau to
reimburse Gardiner for Charles's value.65
Dupirrier v. Dautrive66 was another case involving an owner unable
to recover from those who shot his slave for ignoring an order to halt.
Dup6rrier claimed that the defendants had "wantonly shot and mortally
wounded" 67 his slave while they were riding patrol for the city of New
Iberia. When the patrol spotted the slave, they ordered him to halt, but
the slave galloped away on a horse, whereupon members of the patrol
fired upon him. Testimony established that his master had sent the slave
into town on horseback to run an errand. When the patrol ordered him
to stop, his horse, who was newly broken, bolted; members of the patrol
fired at him three times with shotguns. The slave returned home and
died of his wounds the next day. The District Court of St. Martin Parish
held for the defendants, who, the court reasoned, believed the slave was a
fugitive and were only doing their duty. Unrest among the slaves in and
around New Iberia and rumors of slave insurrection 68 had caused the
patrols to take their responsibilities more seriously than usual. The
supreme court affirmed the judgment, stating that recent disorders
among the slaves in New Iberia called for the strict enforcement of laws
for the police of slaves. The justices cited Section 65 of the Act of 1855,
Act Relative to Slaves and Colored Persons, which provided that any
white who found a slave away from his usual residence who resisted
63. Gardiner, 14 La. Ann. at 733.
64. 14 La. Ann. 34 (1859).
65. Gardiner, 14 La. Ann. at 733.
66. 12 La. Ann. 664 (1856).
67. Id.
68. St. Martin Parish and neighboring parishes were shaken by rumors of slave revolts in the
Fall of 1856. In Dupirrier the patrol shot the slave in August 1855. See Harvey Wish, The Slave
Insurrection Panic of 1856, 5 J.S. Hisr. 217-18 (1939).
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arrest might "make use of arms" to seize and subdue him.69 The use of
weapons, the justices reasoned, implied the risk of killing, and therefore
applied to this case.
70
III. CIVIL SUITS AGAINST OVERSEERS FOR CRUELTY
The Louisiana Supreme Court heard several appeals involving slave-
holders who sued their overseers for brutality and injury to their slaves.
Slaves' hatred toward overseers in the American South is legendary.
Historian Kenneth Stampp and others have charged that overseers had a
marked preference for using physical force in managing their charges. 71
Since slaves did not accord overseers the respect of owners, physical co-
ercion was often necessary to induce obedience. Section 33 of the Black
Code provided for criminal prosecution of persons who beat slaves be-
longing to others without sufficient provocation, as well as providing fi-
nancial compensation for dead or injured slaves. 72 However, not one of
these cases involved criminal prosecutions; all were civil suits to regain
the value of the lost labor of the slaves if they were unable to work as a
result of their injuries, or for the price of the slaves, if the overseer per-
manently disabled or killed them. Often the slaveholder demanded that
the court reduce the overseer's salary as compensation for the loss. Over-
whelmingly, the supreme court ruled in favor of the slave owner, regard-
less of the decision of the lower court. Details from the lower court cases
often reveal that overseers deserved their reputation for harsh and often
excessive measures to maintain discipline and maximize productivity.
The lack of criminal prosecutions, despite overwhelming evidence of bar-
barous treatment, demonstrates the failure of slave law to provide protec-
tion for the basic right to be treated humanely and the resultant
inadequacy of the courts in dealing with cruelty to slaves. There is no
real evidence of a shift in jurisprudence in appeals concerning cruelty
during the antebellum period. Despite changing times and personnel, the
supreme court almost always supported the property interest of the mas-
ters against their overseers except in unusual circumstances.
The earliest case involving an overseer killing a slave is an exception
to the court's more ordinary practice of maintaining an owner's financial
69. Act of March 15, 1855, § 65, 1855 La. Acts 386. See also Witsell v. Earnest, 10 S.C.L. 108,
1 Nott. & McC. 182 (1818).
70. Dupdrrier, 12 La. Ann. at 665.
71. STAMPP, supra note 4, at 183; Alton V. Moody, Slavery on Louisiana Sugar Plantations, 7
LA. HIsT. Q. 210 (1924); WILLIAM K. SCARBOROUGH, THE OVERSEER: PLANTATION MANAGE-
MENT IN THE OLD SOUTH 78-79 (1984). See also Black Code § 33, supra note 2, at 176-78.
72. Black Code § 33, supra note 2, at 176-78.
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interest in his slaves. In Martineau v. Hooper,73 the plaintiff sued his
overseer for killing one of his slaves. Initially the jury found the overseer
blameless and ruled against Martineau. On appeal, the supreme court
refused to rule because the clerk of the district court had failed to provide
a transcript of one witness' testimony. 74 The district court retried the
case in 1820, the jury again found for the defendant, and Martineau ap-
pealed.75 Witnesses testified that Harry, the slave at issue, was so in-
subordinate that his master was afraid to return to his plantation, and he
ordered the overseer to subdue him. Evidence indicated that the slave
was so out of control that he had laid hands on his master. Believing
that the slave would resist him, the overseer took the precaution of load-
ing his gun, although he left it in the house before going outside to whip
the recalcitrant slave. Harry resisted, as predicted, and a scuffle ensued
during which the overseer threatened to kill the slave. Harry took flight,
and Hooper ran to the house, got his gun, and fatally wounded the slave.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Ma-
thews, held Hooper blameless, as the slave was "in an actual state of
rebellion."'7 6 It was imperative, the court ruled, that a slave who set such
an example not go unpunished. The court reasoned that Hooper had
acted as though the slave were his own and that two juries had excused
him for refusing to allow "this rebel slave" to escape with impunity. 77
Martineau v. Hooper was an exceptional decision based on the inter-
est of the slaveholding community in maintaining slave discipline by not
allowing an ungovernable slave to go unpunished. The court was willing
to allow a slaveholder to suffer a loss of his property for the general
safety of the community, although the justices ordinarily ruled in favor
of slave owners.
In 1827, the court heard Perrie v. Williams, 78 another appeal involv-
ing an overseer. Lucy Perrie, an absentee owner, sued her overseer,
James Williams, and her neighbor, Arthur Adams, for killing her slave
Milo. In her petition, Perrie claimed that Williams was an incompetent
overseer who cruelly treated and unnecessarily abused her slaves, drove
them off the plantation, and made a poor crop. She alleged that Williams
and Adams had severely whipped and shot at two other slaves on her
plantation. Adams admitted the shooting, but said it was justified be-
73. 5 Mart. 668 (La. 1818).
74. Id.
75. Martineau v. Hooper, 8 Mart. 669 (La. 1820).
76. Id. at 701.
77. Id.
78. 5 Mart. (n.s.) 694 (La. 1827).
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cause Perrie's slaves often stole his cattle for food because their rations
were so meager. The jury found Williams and Adams liable, and the
judge awarded Perrie $900, $450 each from Williams and Adams. Only
Williams appealed. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the judg-
ment of the lower trial court on the grounds that Perrie had a reasonable
claim for damages because of the "unjustifiable violence and injury done
directly to the property of the plaintiff."
79
Womack v. Nicholson 80 was a civil suit brought by Abraham Wo-
mack, the owner of a slave named Nancy, against Peter Nicholson for
the value of Nancy and other damages. Womack had rented Nancy to
Nicholson, whose overseer, Churchman, had beaten the pregnant slave
woman so severely that she delivered her baby prematurely, and she and
the infant subsequently died. Nicholson denied the allegations against
his overseer, and charged that Womack had represented Nancy as being
"humble, tractable, and healthy," when in fact she was not only sickly,
but "insolent, disobedient, and in the habit of running away." 81 The de-
fendant claimed that Womack owed him $500 for two months of lost
labor, maintenance and medical care for the slave. The Caddo Parish
jury found in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $558, and the defendant
appealed. The testimony of witnesses established that Nancy was an in-
tractable slave, and that she had run away several times from the defend-
ant. One of the witnesses stated that Nancy "required more whipping
than ordinary negroes," and that another planter who had hired her re-
turned her to Womack because of "her vicious and unmanageable char-
acter."'8 2 When Nicholson found Nancy so insubordinate that she was
useless, he ordered Mr. Churchman, his overseer, to return Nancy to her
owner. A neighbor subsequently found her lying by the side of the road,
her head gashed, bruised and swollen, with both old and fresh marks of
the lash on her body. The neighbor who discovered her summoned a
physician, who found symptoms of dropsy (congestive heart failure), as
well as evidence of a severe beating. Womack brought Nancy to his
plantation, where she continued to exhibit symptoms of dropsy. He
never summoned a physician, and Nancy died two months later. The
Caddo Parish jury believed that the beating Nicholson's overseer admin-
istered to Nancy had caused her death, but the supreme court reversed
the decision, stating that although the beating most likely caused the
death of her baby, Nancy had died of dropsy, a preexisting disease. The
79. Id. at 696.
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court held that Womack's neglect in failing to call a physician cost him
full recovery of Nancy's value. The court lowered the award to $158.50,
the cost of medical care for Nancy at the neighbor's house as a result of
the overseer's beating. In modifying the trial court's judgment, Associate
Judge Alonzo Morphy wrote that the decision of the jury was a "mani-
fest error,"' 83 contrary to the evidence as to the cause of Nancy's death.
Although the Supreme Court of Louisiana could review both law and
fact, it could not overturn or modify the verdict of a lower court on the
basis of fact unless, as in this case, the decision was judged clearly wrong,
i.e., a "manifest error."
' 84
Occasionally, masters who believed that their overseer abused one of
their slaves retaliated by withholding their salary. In Hendricks v. Phil-
lips,85 the overseer Hendricks sued Phillips, his employer, for back
wages. Phillips admitted that Hendricks had been his overseer, but
stated that Hendricks had treated his slaves with such cruelty that he
made a reconventional demand (a civil law term for countersuit) 86 for the
amount of the overseer's wages. Witnesses testified that Hendricks was a
capable overseer who made a good crop, but admitted that he had treated
one slave woman with great brutality. Condemning the conduct of the
overseer, Justice Thomas Slidell observed "the details are of a most re-
volting character, and exhibit conduct on the part of the overseer utterly
undefensible."' 87 Since the lower court record has vanished, we do not
know what the "revolting" details were, except that witnesses' testimony
was "extremely unfavorable to him [the overseer] with regard to the
cruel treatment of the negro." Citing Article 173 of the Civil Code,
88
which prohibits masters, and by implication, those to whom masters
delegate power, from inflicting excessively rigorous punishment, as well
as section 3389 of the Black Code, which made anyone cruelly chastising
the slave of another liable for the value of the slave, Justice Thomas
Slidell's opinion modified the decision of the Catahoula Parish District
Court, which had lowered the overseer's salary by the amount of the
value of labor lost during the slave woman's convalescence. The supreme
court ruled that testimony in the case established that the overseer had
83. Id. at 250.
84. See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, supra note 23, tit. IV, art. 63, at 514
and art. 62, at 528.
85. 3 La. Ann. 618 (1848).
86. A "reconventional demand" is the civil law equivalent of a counterclaim in common law.
The court heard an appeal in an almost identical case in which an overseer shot the slave Alfred. See
Taylor v. Patterson, 9 La. Ann. 251 (1854).
87. Hendricks, 3 La. Ann. at 618.
88. CIVIL CODE, art. 173, supra note 6, at 27.
89. Black Code § 33, supra note 2, at 176-78.
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permanently disabled the slave, and that Phillips was entitled to her
value as well as medical expenses. The court awarded Phillips the entire
amount of the overseer's back wages plus $100. 90
The following year the court heard another appeal involving an
overseer, Blanchard v. Dixon.9" In this civil suit, the plaintiff alleged that
Dixon, who was the overseer of plaintiff's neighbor, shot one of his slaves
without provocation. The overseer had seen the slave on the road in
front of Blanchard's residence. When Dixon demanded a pass from the
slave, the slave had answered in French, which the overseer did not un-
derstand. However, Dixon believed from the tone of the reply that the
slave was insolent, whereupon, he demanded that the slave halt. In re-
sponse to this order the slave took flight, and the overseer ran to his
house for his gun, mounted a horse, and pursued the slave until he was
sufficiently close to shoot him, fracturing his knee. Witnesses testified
that the slave had been well-behaved and submissive before the incident.
The overseer cited the Black Code, sections 30 and 3292 to justify the use
of force in arresting a slave absent from his master's premises without a
pass. The district court found for the overseer, but the supreme court
reversed the judgment.93 The court's decision, written by Associate Jus-
tice George Rogers King, compared the case with Allain v. Young, 94 in
which a white man had shot a slave who was out without a pass. The
difference between the two cases, the court reasoned, was that in Allain
the slave had attempted to seize a firearm, and was in the act of commit-
ting a felony, whereas in Blanchard the slave was guilty of no crime but
failing to halt and be examined. As a physician had declared the injury
to be permanent, the court awarded Blanchard $700 in damages, two
thirds of his slave's value, plus $50 in medical expenses. 95
The supreme court cited both Allain and Blanchard in the next ap-
peal that involved an overseer shooting a slave without provocation. Ar-
nandez v. Lawes96 involved two slaves belonging to Jean Baptiste
Arnandez who were catching driftwood at their master's behest when the
overseer of a plantation across the river called them ashore and de-
manded their passes. Although both slaves produced written permits
from their masters to be on the river, the overseer, Thomas B. Lawes,
ordered two armed men standing nearby to restrain both slaves. One of
90. Hendricks, 3 La. Ann. at 619.
91. 4 La. Ann. 57 (1849).
92. Black Code §§ 30, 32, supra note 2, at 172-76.
93. 4 La. Ann. 58 (1849).
94. 9 Mart. 221 (La. 1821). See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
95. Blanchard, 4 La. Ann. at 58.
96. 5 La. Ann. 127 (1850).
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the slaves, William, became frightened and fled. When just a few feet
away, he apparently realized that running might make the situation
worse; he turned to submit to Lawes, just as the overseer fired several
times, mortally wounding William. The lower court ruled in favor of the
owner and awarded him $1,000 in damages. 97 Lawes appealed on
grounds that under section 32 of the Black Code it was not a crime to
shoot a slave who refused to halt.98 The supreme court rejected this ar-
gument, calling Lawes's actions "useless, barbarous, unjustified vio-
lence." 99 In a rare action, the court amended the judgment by raising the
award to Arnandez to $1,200.100
The following year the court heard another appeal from an overseer
who shot a slave for a minor offense. In Benjamin v. Davis, 10 1 Herman P.
Benjamin sued his overseer in a civil action for the value of his slave Ned.
The slave had misbehaved and had subsequently fled because Davis had
planned to whip him. The following day, the overseer armed himself and
a companion, mounted horses, and tracked Ned down with "negro
dogs."' 10 2 After bragging to witnesses that they were off to hunt run-
aways, they returned with a mortally wounded Ned across Davis's sad-
dle. Davis claimed the slave was a fugitive, and as such, could be shot
with impunity according to the Black Code.'0 3 The West Feliciana Dis-
trict Court jury found for the defendant. The supreme court reversed the
decision of the lower court, calling the shooting "totally unjustified."'04
Citing Carmouche v. Bouis,'0 5 the court's decision, written by Associate
Justice Pierre Adolphe Rost, questioned what excuse two able-bodied
armed and mounted men with dogs might have had in firing upon an old,
unarmed slave. Calling the verdict of the lower court "clearly errone-
ous," the court awarded Benjamin $350.106
Six months later, Justice Rost penned the opinion in Dwyer v.
Cane,10 7 another decision involving an overseer's cruel treatment of the
slaves in his charge. Samuel E. Dwyer sued his employer, who had fired
him and refused to pay Dwyer his back wages as overseer. Despite the
fact that Dwyer had made a good crop, "he inflicted cruel and unusual
97. Id. at 129.
98. Black Code § 30, supra note 2, at 176.
99. Arnandez, 5 La. Ann. at 128.
100. Id. at 131.
101. 6 La. Ann. 472 (1851).
102. Id.
103. Black Code § 35, supra note 2, at 180.
104. Benjamin, 6 La. Ann. at 474.
105. 6 La. Ann. 95 (1851). See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
106. Benjamin, 6 La. Ann. at 474.
107. 6 La. Ann. 707 (1851).
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punishments upon the male slaves, and... his conduct with the women
of the plantation was grossly and openly immoral."10 8 The plaintiff
Dwyer lost in the district court, and he appealed to the supreme court.
The court acknowledged that Dwyer was not guilty of such mismanage-
ment and that he should not have been dismissed because he "made a
good crop of cotton.' 109 Nevertheless, it rejected the overseer's demand
for reinstatement and back wages: "Cruelty to slaves is a sufficient cause
of dismissal, and honeste vivere (a Roman law term meaning to live virtu-
ously) forms part of the duties of an overseer."1 0
In 1855, the supreme court heard two appeals from judgments in
which owners claimed that overseers caused the loss of one of their slaves
through excessive punishment. In Kennedy v. Mason, I"' the plaintiff
claimed $600 from the estate of the owner of the plantation as the final
amount due for his wages. The agent of the owner filed a reconventional
demand for $1000, the value of a slave named Jim Crack who allegedly
died at the hands of the overseer as a punishment for having run away.
Witnesses stated that despite extremely cold weather, Kennedy stripped
the slave, tied him "with his belly down to the cold ground," and beat
him steadily for an hour and a half with a hand-saw and a whip. Follow-
ing the beating, Kennedy rubbed the slave with a mixture called No. 61 12
and administered a dose of castor oil. Fellow slaves put Jim Crack in his
bed, where he died within a few hours. The lower court found in favor of
the unpaid overseer, but the supreme court reversed the decision. The
physician who conducted the post mortem exam had concluded that the
whipping alone did not cause Crack's death but that the combination of
the whipping and exposure to the frigid weather was fatal:
[The physician testified] "I saw that he had been whipped and consid-
erably bruised on his buttock, and each side of his shoulders. The but-
tock and sides of the shoulders did not appear much cut, but
considerably bruised, from which the blood oozed and stuck to the
shirt in a few places. That amount of whipping under ordinary cir-
cumstances, would not produce death. I thought it imprudent to whip
the boy at that time and under the circumstances. From internal and
108. Dwyer, 6 La. Ann. at 707. Cruelty to slaves was not an uncommon cause of dismissal. See
SCARBOROUGH, supra note 71, at 96.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11. 10 La. Ann. 519 (1855).
112. Id. at 520. No. 6 may refer to one of the six basic medicines of the "system," which was
brandy or wine fortified with herbs, roots, bark and other natural ingredients, thought to strengthen
"the internal system and the weakened patient." TODD L. SAVITT, MEDICINE AND SLAVERY: THE
DISEASES AND HEALTH CARE OF BLACKS IN ANTEBELLUM VIRGINIA 170 n.37 (1978). Another
court record states that a sick slave was rubbed down with brandy and cayenne pepper. Cayenne
pepper was No. 2 of the system. Buddy v. Vanleer, 6 La. Ann. 34 (1851).
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external indications, I think it more likely that death was caused by a
congestive chill, than by the whipping; but more likely death in this
case was caused by a combination of all the circumstances." Under
this state of facts we do not think it is unreasonable to infer that the
slave's death was caused by the severity of the punishment inflicted
upon him, combined with his exposure to the weather. Had the plain-
tiff taken proper care of him after he retired to his cabin, he might have
averted the unfortunate consequence: but he did not. This was gross
negligence on his part."
13
In overturning the decision of the Ouachita Parish District Court,
the supreme court allowed the reconventional demand of the owner's
agent for the full value of Jim Crack. The overseer requested a rehearing
on the grounds that Jim Crack had been a frequent runaway and was
therefore virtually of no value. A witness testified that she had known
the slave since he was a child, and "with his character and habits he was
entirely worthless."' 14 Notwithstanding the testimony, the court refused
to grant him a rehearing." 5
During the same month, the supreme court heard a similar case,
Kemp v. Hutchinson.' 6 The overseer had whipped a slave named "Big
Nancy" twice in one day for stealing, and was threatening a third flog-
ging if she did not produce the allegedly stolen articles. She denied the
theft, but said she would try to find the articles. Instead, she threw her-
self into a river and was drowned. What distinguished Kemp from Ken-
nedy v. Mason, Associate Justice Alexander Buchanan reasoned in the
court's opinion, was that there was no proof that the overseer caused Big
Nancy's death, which was what Justice Buchanan termed a "voluntary
act." ' 7 The court ruled that the overseer was not responsible for the
slave woman's death:
The power of correction of a slave, vested in his master by our law, was
held, in the case of Kennedy v. Mason, to be delegated to an overseer,
from the nature of his employment. In the exercise of that power, the
owner of the slave or his delegate, is only to be held responsible for the
immediate and necessary consequences of his acts. "18
The court ordered Hutchinson to pay the overseer the wages he had
withheld. 19
The following year the court heard what would be the case that
most clearly demonstrated the inability of the legal system to deal with
113. Kennedy, 10 La. Ann. at 520-21.
114. Id. at 522.
115. Id.
116. 10 La. Ann. 494 (1855).





excessive cruelty to slaves, Humphreys v. UtZ.' 20 Unlike the vague refer-
ence in Hendricks to "details ... of a most revolting character,"' 21 this
unreported case is revoltingly specific as to details of barbarous treat-
ment. Humphreys was a suit for civil damages of $5,000 brought by J.C.
and G.W. Humphreys, absentee owners of the Burkland plantation in
Madison Parish, against Henry Utz, their overseer, for damages he
caused "by inflicting unusual unnecessary and cruel punishment."1 22 In
the petition, the Humphreys brothers alleged that Utz inflicted "cruel
treatment of an unusual inhuman and outrageous nature.., upon two of
the negroes placed under his care,"' 23 and that one of the slaves, named
"Ginger Pop" died from Utz's cruelty. Specifically, the Humphreys
charged that Utz had killed Ginger Pop by "nailing the privates of said
negro to the bedstead and then inflicting blows upon him until said negro
pulled loose from the post to which he had been pinned by driving an
iron tack or nail through his penis."' 24 The Humphreys further alleged
that Utz had "inflicted a similar outrage upon a certain negro boy named
Dave," 25 who also belonged to them.
In his answer, Utz denied the allegations of cruelty. He claimed
that the Humphreys had hired him to manage the plantation for the year
1853 for a yearly salary of $800. He said he had served as overseer until
he was "wrongfully discharged"1 26 on August 19, 1853, and he made a
reconventional demand for his salary. He stated that he "was at all times
attentive to his business, kind to the sick and humain [sic] to all,"' 27 and
that the plaintiffs were bent on ruining his reputation as "a careful man-
ager of negroes, and a good cultivator of the soil."' 28 He alleged that the
slaves of Burkland plantation "had the reputation of being difficult to
manage, and several of them were habitual runaways."' 29 Utz asked for
$6,000 in damages from the Humphreys for the damage done to his
reputation.
120. Humphreys v. Utz, No. 3910 (La. 1856) (unreported decision of Louisiana Supreme Court,
case records on file at Earl K. Long Library, Univ. of New Orleans).
121. Hendricks v. Phillips, 3 La. Ann. 618 (1848); see supra text accompanying note 92.
122. Humphreys v. Utz, No. 3910 (La. 1856) (unreported decision of Louisiana Supreme Court,
case records on file at Earl K. Long Library, Univ. of New Orleans).
123. Id.
124. Id. It is unclear whether Utz actually nailed the slave's penis to the bedpost, or whether he
nailed only the foreskin. One witness said that Utz "had drove a tack through the skin of his penis
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A witness to the incident testified that Ginger Pop was a habitual
runaway, and apparently Utz had tried to discipline him in other ways,
once attempting to nail his ear to the gallery of the plantation house and
once "took the butt end of his cowhide and whipped--on the head as
long as he could stand over him."' 30 Gabriel Utz, brother to the defend-
ant and himself an overseer on a neighboring plantation, testified that
Ginger Pop was always running away, and that Henry Utz had told him
that he only tacked Ginger Pop's penis to the bedpost to scare him, "that
it had done more good than all the whippings, that it had calmed
him." 3 ' Gabriel Utz also testified that Ginger Pop would have been
worth from $800 to $1,000 if he were not a habitual runaway, but with
his character, he was "worth little or nothing."'
32
On the night Ginger Pop died, Utz told a witness "that he was
damd [sic] glad of it and wished he could get clear of Shed and Maria
[other slaves on the plantation] the same way, deft [sic] told witness next
morning that he had slept the happiest nights [sic] sleep he had since he
had been on the place."' 33 Ginger Pop died on June 10; the Humphreys
called a physician to conduct a post mortem examination on August 20,
but the decomposition of the body prevented him from coming to any
conclusion regarding the cause of death. Utz claimed Ginger Pop had
died of a "congestive chill," although he admitted that "he had worn him
out."' 34 The Humphreys fired Utz the same day.
The trial court jury found for Utz in the amount of $388.86. They
arrived at this amount by calculating Utz's wages from January 1 to Au-
gust 20-$508.83-and then deducted damages to Ginger Pop of
$120.'35 Why did the Madison Parish jury find for Utz despite over-
whelming evidence against him? Why was Utz never convicted of cru-
elty in a criminal trial? The answer to both questions lies in the
appellant's brief to the supreme court. The Humphreys' attorney, An-
drew R. Hynes, made this argument to the court:
It will be remembered that the Mssrs. Humphreys reside in the State of
Mississippi and seldom visit the Burkland plantation, and were not
present at the trial of this suit in the District Court. The Grand Jury
acting in and for the Parish of Madison, indicted the defendant for
cruel treatment of the slaves of the plaintiff, and the Jury impanelled to









was direct and overwhelming. It will be remembered that in a sparsely
peopled country, where the owners of property are non-residents, the
Jurors of the country are almost entirely made up of Overseers, and
that perhaps no class is so clannish or so disposed to protect each other
in their difficulties. Whenever a planter shall in a contest with an over-
seer resort to a jury, there can be no doubt as to what the verdict will
be, and the only hope left to the country is that the purity of the Bench
will correct the evil.
136
Justice Alexander Buchanan wrote the decision of the court. He
acknowledged that Ginger Pop was "an incorrigible runaway . . a vi-
cious and worthless subject," 137 although he stated that there was no
proof that the death of the slave had been caused by Utz's cruel treat-
ment. However, Buchanan did not allow Utz to avoid the consequences
of his actions:
Yet acts of revolting brutality have been proved, which entirely
exceed the limits of that repressive and correctional discipline which is
necessary to the management of the agricultural laborers of the South
... [which] should be strict... but.., tempered with mercy. The evil
passions of men become infuriated to reckless ferocity by unbridled
indulgence: and the very helplessness of the slave ... is sometimes
found to encourage ... cold blooded refinements of torture. He who
cannot protect himself has a double claim to protection.
1 38
The supreme court reversed the decision of the trial court, and ruled
that Humphreys' discharge of Utz was justified. Ordering Utz to pay his
wages to the date of his discharge to the plaintiffs-$508.83-the
supreme court also ruled that Utz pay costs in both courts.
139
The following year, in Miller v. Stewart, 140 another overseer sued his
employer for his wages of $800 for two years' service, and the owner filed
a reconventional demand for $1,250 because he claimed the overseer was
liable for the death of one of his slaves. In the appeal, the overseer
claimed that the slave had attacked him and was incorrigible, and that
the slave Tom resisted when he had attempted to whip him. During the
scuffle Tom bit off the tip of Miller's finger and scratched his face. Fi-
136. Id. Hynes's assessment of the cause of Utz's acquittal from criminal charges may well be
accurate. The Census of 1850 for Madison Parish lists only 404 persons qualified to vote, meaning
white males of twenty-one years or older. The census also indicates that there were sixty-six over-
seers. Although we cannot know how many overseers were in the jury pool at any given time, the
census would indicate that the possibility of getting several overseers on any given jury was high.
The total population of Madison Parish in 1850 was 8,773, of whom 1,416 were white and 7,353
were slaves. Only four free persons of color resided in Madison Parish in 1850. SUPERINTENDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES CENSUS, THE SEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1850.
137. Humphreys v. Utz, No. 3910 (La. 1856) (unreported decision of Louisiana Supreme Court,
case records on file at Earl K. Long Library, Univ. of New Orleans).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 12 La. Ann. 170 (1857).
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nally, Miller subdued the slave, loaded him with chains, staked him to
the ground, and gave him a severe lashing. An eyewitness claimed that
Miller had whipped Tom from his neck to his heels, and that the stripes
were so close together that a person could not put a finger between
them.' 4 ' This witness testified that he had never seen a slave whipped
with such brutality. 42 The two physicians who conducted the post-
mortem exam agreed that either the flogging itself or exhaustion and over
exertion from the scourging caused Tom's death. The Carroll Parish
jury awarded Miller $344.15, the wages he had earned from the time of
his employment to the time of his discharge, and Stewart appealed. Cit-
ing Kennedy v. Mason, 43 and describing the overseer's actions as "gross
negligence," the supreme court awarded Stewart his reconventional de-
mand of $1,200, the assessed value of the slave, deducting $344, wages
Stewart owed the overseer.'" Justice Voorhies, writing for the court,
quoted section 16 of the "Crimes and Offenses" section of the Black
Code,' 45 and questioned the overseer's allegations that Tom was a
troublemaker:
[T]here is not a scintilla of evidence showing that the slave Tom was
vicious or that his character was bad; nor was there any attempt to
show the nature of the offence which brought upon him such severe
punishment.... The overseer may correct and chastise the slaves of
the planter who employs him, but he cannot do so "with unusual rigor,
nor so to maim or mutilate them, or to expose them to the danger of
loss of life, or to cause their death."' 46
The supreme court heard the last case involving improper conduct
by an overseer to a slave in Kessee v. Mayfield & Cage.'47 Kessee sued
the defendants for his wages of $800 for one year as overseer of their
plantation. The owners had employed him on April 10, 1856 and dis-
charged him, Kessee alleged, for no reason on June 22, 1856. Kessee's
attorneys cited Civil Code article 2720, which required an employer who
fired an employee without cause to honor the terms of the contract of
hiring, paying him wages for the entire time provided for in the agree-
ment. 48 The defendants asserted that they fired Kessee for good cause:
incompetence, disregarding defendant's instructions, and cruelty to the
141. Id. at 171.
142. Id.
143. 10 La. Ann. 519 (1855).
144. Miller, 12 La. Ann. at 171.
145. Black Code, Crimes and Offenses § 16, supra note 2, at 206-08.
146. Miller, 12 La. Ann. at 171 (citation omitted).
147. 14 La. Ann. 90 (1859).
148. CIVIL CODE, art. 2720, supra note 6, at 418.
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slaves. 149 Mayfield and Cage were willing to pay Kessee for the two
months he worked for them, but Kessee claimed wages for the whole
year. Although the owners introduced no evidence to prove their allega-
tions that the overseer was cruel or incompetent, evidence supported
their claim that he disregarded their instructions. The defendants had
strictly ordered Kessee not to discipline the slaves with his own hand.1
5 0
Drivers were to flog the slaves if they should need chastisement. 151 Wit-
nesses stated that Kessee ignored these instructions and lashed the slaves
himself. The District Court of Terrebonne Parish found that the owners
had discharged Kessee for good cause and denied him any wages whatso-
ever. As the defendants had been willing, despite Kessee's actions, to pay
the overseer wages for the actual time worked, this award was more
favorable than the defendants had demanded. The supreme court re-
versed this ruling, and granted Kessee wages for the period he had actu-
ally worked. In its ruling, the court stated that although Article 2720
applied only to persons fired with no cause, it seemed unfair not to grant
Kessee wages to the time of his discharge.
52
IV. CIVIL SUITS AGAINST OWNERS FOR CRUELTY
Appeals of civil lawsuits involving Louisiana masters abusing their
own slaves occurred infrequently during the antebellum period. The
supreme court heard only a total of three such appeals during that pe-
riod. In the first, Markham v. Close,153 the plaintiff presented a petition
to the District Court of Opelousas in which he alleged that his neighbor,
Close, had cruelly beaten his own slave, Augustin. Markham requested
that the court take the slave away from Close and sell him. Close did not
deny the beating, but claimed that the slave had been a fugitive for some
time, and that he deserved the punishment. Witnesses testified that the
flogging was so severe that Augustin was incapable of sitting or lying on
his back, and that Close had lashed him on three separate occasions. His
back was "very much cut and skinned.., the weather being warm, the
wounds smelled badly."' 154 The district court judge placed the case on its
docket as a civil action, and although Close protested that the proceed-
ings were unknown to the law, and that Markham had no standing to
institute such a suit, the lower court ordered Close to sell the slave. He
149. Kessee, 14 La. Ann. at 90.
150. Id.
151. Id. Disobeying orders not to whip slaves was another common cause of dismissal for over-
seers. SCARBOROUGH, supra note 71, at 93-94.
152. Kessee, 14 La. Ann. at 90.
153. 2 La. 581 (1831).
154. Id. at 582.
[Vol. 68:1283
DETAILS ARE OF A REVOLTING CHARACTER
appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court.155
The supreme court, in a decision written by Associate Judge Alex-
ander Porter, found that Markham's petition was "an anomalous action,
instituted in civil form to punish a criminal offense."' 56 The court stated
that Markham had no interest in the slave, but had presented himself to
the court as a public prosecutor. It acknowledged that evidence sup-
ported Markham's claim that Close had been excessively cruel to the
slave. "It is greatly to be deplored, that owners of slaves should abuse
their authority,"' 57 the court stated. However, while admitting the cru-
elty to the slave, the court denied that Markham had any right to insti-
tute such a suit. Excessive cruelty, the court reasoned, was a public
offense that had to be prosecuted criminally, according to section 16 of
the Black Code.' 58 The court also cited article 192 of the Civil Code, ' 9
which stated that a master could not be compelled to sell his slave unless
he was actually convicted of cruel treatment. In such cases the judge
could order the sale of a slave at public auction "in order to place him
out of the reach of the power which his master has abused."' 6" Without
a criminal conviction, no court could order the sale of the slave. Mark-
ham could not take the law into his own hands in this manner, the court
ruled. Reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme court found
that while Markham's motives might have been admirable, in another
instance, a person bringing a similar suit might be motivated by "envy,
malice, and all uncharitableness."' 6' There is no record of any subse-
quent criminal prosecution against Close.
In 1857, the court heard Barrow v. McDonald,162 a lawsuit for dam-
ages for the "malicious killing" of a slave by one of his owners. The
plaintiff, Robert Ruffin Barrow, owned a three-fourths interest in the
slave while the defendant, who managed one of Barrow's four sugar plan-
tations, owned a one-fourth interest. Barrow estimated his losses at
$1,500. Barrow and McDonald were business partners, and owned the
sugar plantation where the killing occurred in the same proportions in
which they owned the slave. The judge in the Terrebonne District Court
ruled that the damages should properly be a part of the action to dissolve
155. Id.
156. Id. at 581.
157. Id. at 584.
158. Black Code, Crimes and Offenses § 16, supra note 2, at 206-08.
159. CIVIL CODE, art. 192, supra note 6, at 29-30.
160. Id.
161. Markham, 2 La. at 587.
162. 12 La. Ann. 110 (1857). Barrow was a wealthy Terrebonne Parish slave owner who owned
four sugar plantations: "Residence," Myrtle Grove, "Caillou Grove," and "Point Farm." SCARBOR-
OUGH, supra note 71, at 187.
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the partnership between the two men (which was in progress), and not a
separate action. The supreme court agreed with this assessment and af-
firmed the judgment.1 63
The high court heard the last appeal involving cruelty to a slave by a
master in Ney v. Richard.M64 This case was a civil action which arose
because of the improper handling of a criminal case. The sheriff of St.
Landry Parish arrested Adele Roy Ney for cruel treatment of her slave
Frozine. The parish court judge released Ney after she posted bail. At
the same time, he ordered Frozine to be incarcerated in parish prison
pending the outcome of the trial. His purpose was to furnish the slave
protection from Ney. Ney's husband filed an action against the parish
judge and the sheriff. The district court judge ruled that sequestering the
slave to remove her from Ney's power was the proper action under the
circumstances. The supreme court ruled that the district court had erred
in its ruling because no law existed to remove a slave from the power of
his or her master without a criminal conviction for cruelty. The court
ordered the release of the slave to the Neys.1 65 No record exists of an
appeal of the criminal prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
Louisiana law provided slaves few protections against cruel treat-
ment, although the legal machinery was in place had witnesses, prosecu-
tors, judges, and juries chosen to use it. Evidence in appeals to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana shows that strangers, neighbors, overseers
and owners abused slaves at times and ignored laws designed to protect
slaves from excessively cruel treatment. Most of these cases involve irate
owners bringing civil actions to recover damages for slaves injured or
killed by others. Although the court heard no criminal appeals until af-
ter 1846 because it lacked jurisdiction, after 1846 the court heard few
criminal appeals of this nature. Masters were apparently more interested
in financial compensation than justice. Since lower court records of
criminal prosecutions are not accessible or have not survived, these ap-
peals are the only solid evidence of prosecutions for cruelty to slaves in
Louisiana. Slave owners created the legal system that prohibited cruel
treatment, and the judiciary as a whole seems to have been very reluctant
to interfere with slaveholders and their slaves through criminal prosecu-
tions. Additionally, we have no way of knowing how many persons ac-
163. Barrow, 12 La. Ann. at I11.
164. 15 La. Ann. 603 (1860).
165. Id. at 604.
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cused of excessive cruelty were acquitted despite overwhelming evidence
to the contrary, because juries simply refused to convict. Humphreys v.
Utz 166 demonstrated the failure of the law to provide even the most basic
protection for slaves. When the limited right of slaves to life conflicted
with the property interests of slaveholders, the outcome was seldom in
doubt. However, the courts were quite willing to support the slave own-
ers' financial interest in injured or dead slaves, which they approached as
a simple issue of awarding property damages.
When the slaveholder was the abuser, the legal system was even less
willing to interfere with what many judges and juries perceived as a mat-
ter between slave owners and their property. Only the most atrocious
crimes occasionally resulted in criminal prosecutions. In cases involving
criminal prosecutions of a slave owner, the cruel treatment was suffi-
ciently rigorous to cause the death of the slave. Although the legal status
of slaves in Louisiana was insignificant compared to their powerful own-
ers, the law protected the slaveholders from their slaves. The paradox of
the slave as at once person and property often disappeared when the
slave committed a crime. In that instance they were often persons in the
eyes of the law. But when the slave was victimized by his owner's exces-
sive cruelty, Louisiana law was far more cognizant of the slave as prop-
erty. As a result, the legal system was rendered inadequate in protecting
slaves' personal rights.
166. Humphreys v. Utz, No. 3910 (La. 1856) (unreported decision of the Lousiaina Supreme
Court, on file at the Earl K. Long Library, Univ. of New Orleans).
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